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Spouse Abuse: A Novel Remedy for a
Historic Problem
I. Introduction
Spouse abuse encompasses the physical assault of one spouse by
the other.' The major problem is that of a woman 2 being severely
physically abused by her present or former husband or her male
companion, 3 a problem exacerbated both by the woman's emotional
I. One sociologist's study isolated eight types of physical violence between spouses:
throwing things, pushing, slapping, kicking or biting, hitting, beating up, threatening with a
gun or a knife, and using a gun or a knife. Of the eight, throwing things was a tactic utilized
predominantly by wives, while slapping and "beating up" were practiced largely by husbands.
Straus, Wife Beating.- How Common and Why, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 34, 35-37 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Straus].
Courts have noted numerous acts of serious physical abuse. See, e.g., Vasquez v. State,
350 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 360 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1978) (husband
broke into apartment of estranged wife and struck her in the face with his fists); People v.
Gray, 69 Ill. 2d 44, 370 N.E.2d 797 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978) (husband struck
his wife with a gun and subsequently shot her); Ortmann v. Ortmann, 547 S.W.2d 226 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977) (husband struck wife and tore off her ear); Commonwealth v. Ulatoski, 472 Pa. 53,
371 A.2d 186 (1977) (husband shot and killed his wife).
Rape occurring within marriage, however, is generally not considered an offense. See,
e.g., State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3103 (Purdon 1973). But see Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77
(1978) (when husband and two others attempted to rape wife at gunpoint, she recovered from
husband in tort). See generally Bienen, Rape!. 3 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 45 (1976); Bienen,
Rape I, 3 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 90 (1977); Geis, Rape-In-Marriage, 6 ADEL. L. REV. 284
(1978); 82 DICK. L. REV. 608 (1978) (noting State v. Smith, 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977)).
2. Although husband-beating occurs, studies indicate that wives are the primary vic-
tims, experiencing more serious and more frequent violence; for example, between 1.8 and 3.3
million women are beaten by their husbands, while only 280,000 men are abused by their
wives annually. Domestic Violence and Legislation with Respect to Domestic Violence (S. 1728)."
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Child and Human Development of the Senate Comm. on
Human Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1978) (statement of Steve Y'Barra) [hereinafter
cited as 1978 Senate Hearings]. See also Straus, supra note 1, at 46. The preponderance of
wife beatings exists because women are usually physically weaker and more financially depen-
dent. See note 4 infra.
Suits initiated by husbands are anomalous. See, e.g., Foster v. Withrow, 201 Ga. 260, 39
S.E.2d 466 (1946) (husband sought a peace bond to protect himself from the beatings inflicted
upon him by his wife); West v. West, 309 S.W.2d 341 (Ky. 1958) (husband counterclaimed for
absolute divorce on grounds that his wife encouraged her adult sons by a former marriage to
assault him). But cf. The Battered Husbands, TIME, March 20, 1978, at 69.
3. The spouse abuse phenomenon encompasses not only married couples but also di-
vorced couples, separated couples, and those merely living together. See, e.g., In re Adoption
of Sandra Fay Burton, 43 111. App. 3d 294, 356 N.E.2d 1279 (1976) (husband allegedly re-
turned to abuse wife from whom he was separated); Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d
345 (1973), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 592, 506 P.2d 336 (1973) (husband intentionally knifed es-
tranged wife); Commonwealth v. Kane, 199 Pa. Super. Ct. 89, 184 A.2d 405 (1962) (defendant
committed assault and battery upon his former wife).
and financial dependency upon her abuser' and by the inadequacy
of her legal remedies.5  Society has until recently not only failed to
ameliorate the situation, but has also impliedly condoned the physi-
cal abuse of women.6
The pervasiveness of spouse abuse requires an effective national
remedy. Despite the fact that wife-beating is grossly underreported,1
police statistics and crime reports indicate the magnitude and the
serious nature of the offense. For example, between 7,000 and
10,000 complaints of marital violence, seventy-five percent of which
are from women, inundate the Citizen's Complaint Center in the
4. Reasons that wives remain with husbands who beat them include: (a) their parents
beat them, (b) they lack the financial means to leave, (c) they are afraid of what their neighbors
will think, (d) if among poorer women, they generally rely on police aid exclusively to settle
domestic disputes, which subjects them to conciliatory tactics. Williams, The Right Not to be
Beaten, PSYCH. TODAY, June 1977, at 36. See notes 51-53 and accompanying text infra. Ad-
ditionally, wives may be immobilized by fear of violent husbands as well as socially condi-
tioned to preserve their marriages at any cost. D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES (1976) at 72-86
[hereinafter cited as BATTERED WIVES. See generally Eisenberg and Seymour, The Se/f-De-
fense Plea and Battered Women, 14 TRIAL No. 7, 34 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Se/f-Defense
Plea].
Statistics further emphasize the unequal employment opportunities and limited earning
potential of women, often necessitating their remaining with abusive husbands. Working wo-
men generally receive fifty-seven cents for every dollar earned by men. Even women with
college degrees receive remuneration on a par with men who have only completed the eighth
grade. Note, The Case for Legal Remedies for Abused Women, 6 N.Y.U. REV. OF L. & Soc.
CHANGE 135, 139 (1977), citing WOMEN'S BUREAU, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRA-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES DEP'T OF LABOR, THE EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN WOMEN AND
MEN (1976) [hereinafter cited as Casefor Legal Remedies]. For an excellent discussion of and
recent statistics on female underrepresentation in the judicial system see Cook, Women Judges:
The End of Tokenism, in WOMEN IN THE COURTS 84, 95-103 (1978).
Despite these sociological and economic findings, however, the growth of shelter services
tends to indicate that women are increasingly willing to leave their abusive husbands, particu-
larly if sanctuary exists. See notes 39-48 and accompanying text infra. Also, younger women
increasingly flee from abusive situations. [1978] 4 FAM. L. REP (BNA) 2698.
5. Presently, not only are extra-judicial remedies, such as shelter services, ill-equipped
to deal with the numbers of battered spouses requiring immediate aid but in addition, the
available criminal and civil remedies are wholly inadequate for a variety of reasons. See dis-
cussion at Part Ill infra.
6. A wall plaque displayed in the Indiana Holiday Inn reads: "A woman, a dog, and a
walnut tree, the more you beat, the better they be." Eisenberg and Micklow, The Assaulted
Wife: "Catch 22" Revisited, 3 WOMEN's RIGHTS L. REP. 138 (1977) [hereinafter Assaulted
Wife]. An American joke was broadcast by the British Broadcasting Corp. as follows: "One
woman asks another why she feels her husband doesn't love her anymore. The answer: 'He
hasn't bashed me in a fortnight.' " Straus, supra note 1, at 35. New York Supreme Court
Justice Gellinoff recognized the problem when he stated, "For too long, Anglo-American law
treated a man's physical abuse of his wife as different from any other assault, and, indeed, as
acceptable practice." Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 1048, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 975 (Sup. Ct.
1977), rev'd, 64 App. Div. 2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978).
Federal attempts to remedy spouse abuse have been noticeably few. But see note 42 infra.
7. Domestic violence is considerably underreported because it is either regarded as nor-
mal or women are reluctant to admit that it happens to them. The accuracy of statistics is also
questionable, since they generally deal with married couples, not divorced ones. Straus, supra
note I, at 38-39. Excessive violence is a major cause of divorce. See, e.g., Frigano v. Frigano,
72 Misc. 2d 886, 339 N.Y.S.2d 533 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (wife sued for divorce, support, and exclu-
sive possession of the marital home from a husband who repeatedly choked and struck her);
Kobe v. Kobe, [1979] 22 A.T.L.A. L. REP. No. 3, 117 (Ohio App. Dec. 21, 1978) (wife sued for
divorce on grounds that she had been severely beaten by her husband). For general informa-
tion presented at the U.S. Civil Rights Comm'n public hearings on battered women regarding
the accuracy of statistics see [1978] 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2202.
District of Columbia annually.8 Writers, moreover, present extrapo-
lations that are even more startling;9 one postulated that at least
twenty-eight million women have been beaten by their husbands.'I
The extent of the problem is further emphasized by statistics that
reveal that this phenomenon transcends all class and ethnic barri-
ers.'' Professionals engage in wife-beating as frequently as do un-
skilled workers; whites, as often as minorities.
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The effects of spouse abuse are alarming and can be self-perpet-
uating. From receiving continuous beatings a woman is usually
physically and psychologically injured, often necessitating her hospi-
talization and resulting in lower self-esteem.' 3 Wife-abuse may not
only incapacitate a woman but may serve as a catalyst for further
family violence. Studies indicate that a child in a violent household
often suffers abuse from either parent and tends to imitate the role
models he observed when he reaches adulthood. "4 Additionally, re-
8. BATTERED WIVES, supra note 4, at 12. Almost 500 battered wives sought help from
crisis centers in New York City from July 1977 to January 1978. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 20 (1978) [hereinafter COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS].
Furthermore, spouse abuse is a major international problem. See, e.g., Beaulieu, Media,
Violence and the Family. A Canadian View, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 58 (1978) (Canada): Free-
man, Le Vice Anglais? - Wife-Battering in English and American Law, II FAM. L. Q. 199
(1977) (England and United States).
9. One researcher estimates that 1.8 million wives are beaten annually by their hus-
bands. Straus, supra note 1, at 36.
10. Footlick & Sciolino, Wives Who Baiter Back, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 30, 1978, at 54.
11. In Fairfax County, Virginia, one of the wealthiest counties in the United States, the
police estimate that 30 warrants are sought by assaulted women each week for the arrest of
their husbands. BATTERED WIVES, supra note 4, at 19, citing Bill Peterson, System Frustrates
Battered Wives, Wash. Post, Nov. 2, 1974, at 18.
Instead of attributing spouse abuse to a "lower class" mentality, one sociologist enumer-
ates more general factors and their interrelationships; these include: (a) the high level of vio-
lence in society; (b) the high level of violence in family; (c) child rearing patterns training
children to be violent, which legitimizes familial violence and influences the personality, link-
ing love and violence; (d) the desire to reassert male dominance, when threatened, in a patriar-
chal system; and (e) sexual inequalities that leave a woman locked into a brutal marriage.
Straus, supra note 1, at 41. See generally Stark & McEvoy, Middle-Class Violence, PSYCH.
TODAY, Nov. 1970, at 52-53.
Some correlation between the incidence of spouse abuse and alcoholism, however, does
exist. In Appalachia, for example, a particularly severe problem of wife-beating results from
alcohol and drug abuse as well as from general substandard living conditions. Williams, The
Right Not to be Beaten, PSYCH. TODAY, June 1977, at 36. Additionally, 85% of violent hus-
bands in California have either alcohol or other drug problems. 1978 Senate Hearings, supra
note 2, at 6 (statement of Betty J. Stephens).
12. Of the 26 battered women who sought counseling from the Women's Center of
Greater Danbury, in Fairfield County, Connecticut, 24 were the wives of professionals. Cook,
New Focus on Battered Women, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1977, § 23 (Connecticut Weekly), at 1,
col. 3. Furthermore, studies indicate that dentists are the most physically violent of the profes-
sionals, while lawyers are the most psychologically abusive. [1978] 4 FAM, L. REP. (BNA)
2698.
13. See, e.g., People v. Cameron, 53 Cal. App. 3d 786, 126 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1975) (husband
twisted wife's breast and broke her nose); People v. Small, 7 Cal. App. 3d 347, 86 Cal. Rptr.
478 (1970) (before eventually murdering his wife, defendant twice injured her seriously, neces-
sitating medical treatment). For an excellent examination of the nature of abuse, see Casefor
Legal Remedies, supra note 4, at 138-41.
14. At least 10% of the children who witness parental violence eventually become abusive
cent cases illustrate that wife-beating engenders self-defense killing
of the attacker, an act for which a sympathetic jury or bench is in-
creasingly willing to exonerate the wife.'
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Almost all states, however, offer only minimal legal protection
to an abused wife before she resorts to killing her attacker. This defi-
ciency in the system requires immediate consideration and rectifica-
tion. In response, this comment discusses the historical background
of the spouse-abuse problem and examines the effectiveness of vari-
ous statutory approaches for protecting a battered spouse. More-
over, Pennsylvania's Protection from Abuse Act 6 and its recent
amendments are analyzed in the context of these schemes. Finally,
in an attempt to present a viable solution to the problem of spouse
abuse, rules of procedure for the enforcement of the Pennsylvania
law are recommended and further amendment is suggested.
II. Societal Context of Spouse Abuse
The sociological phenomenon of wife abuse is a historic
one, 17reflective of both the social subjugation of women and of the
disparate treatment accorded them under the common law. Theo-
rists attribute wife beating to a variety of factors: a Freudian patho-
logical or masochistic desire by the woman to be injured,' 8 a
reassertion of male dominance over women according to sex role ste-
reotypes,' 9 a general reaction to familial stress,"° and a response to
external factors, such as alcohol and drug usage.' Several writers
have stressed the psychological undertones, concluding that reeduca-
tion of the male and the establishment of treatment centers would
spouses themselves. 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 19 (statement of Steve Y'Barra).
Children in violent households may also be abused. See, e.g., State v. Seelke, 221 Kan. 672,
561 P.2d 869 (1977) (husband who physically and sexually abused his wife also threatened to
kill their babies). See generally Gates, Victims of Rape and Wfe Abuse, in WOMEN IN THE
COURTS 176, 186 (1978); [1978] 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2698.
15. See, e.g., State v. Seelke, 221 Kan. 672, 561 P.2d 869 (1977) (wife who shot and killed
an abusive husband was convicted of voluntary manslaughter; a new trial was granted on
appeal because the evidence of past brutal attacks warranted a jury instruction on involuntary
manslaughter). For a novel examination of this type of self-defense killing see Comment, The
Battered Wfe Syndrome, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 213 (1978). See generally Self-Defense Plea,
supra note 4.
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977).
17. A medieval theological manual displayed in the British Museum permits a husband
to castigate his wife for correction. E. DAVIS, THE FIRST SEX 252 (1971). Moreover, in the
sixteenth century, the Russian state church issued a household ordinance listing methods by
which a man should effectively beat his wife. W. MANDEL, SOVIET WOMEN 22 (1975). See
BATTERED WIVES, supra note 4, at 28-31. But see R. v. Jackson, [18911 i Q.B. 671, 682 (the
Master of the Rolls doubted whether wife-beating was ever the law).
18. Freeman, The Phenomenon of Marital Violence and the Legal and Social Response in
England, in FAMILY VIOLENCE 73, 76 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Freeman]. See generally S.
FREUD, The Economic Problem in Masochism, in 11 COLLECTED PAPERS 255 (1946).
19. BATTERED WIVES, supra note 4, at 66-71.
20. Straus, supra note 1, at 41-45.
21. 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 6 (statement of Betty J. Stephens). See note I I
supra.
provide panaceas." While improved social services are requisite, a
concomitant legal remedy is equally vital to alleviate immediately
the effects of the historic problem.
A. Common Law Antecedents
At common law a husband had an absolute right to chastize his
wife, provided the rod he used could pass through a wedding band.23
Even though this concept, which generally recognized women as
chattel, was adopted in the United States, 4 by the nineteenth cen-
tury state courts began to repudiate the notion that the institution of
marriage licensed the indiscriminate striking of one's wife.2" Cur-
rently, courts occasionally reiterate that "[w]hatever may have been
the common-law view of the right of a husband to chastize his wife,
the modern view is clearly to the contrary and inhibits the use of
physical force or violence upon the person of the wife."26
B. The Doctrine of Interspousal Immunity
Vestiges of this common-law view remain, however, in tort law,
in which the doctrine of interspousal immunity can effectively pre-
vent a wife from suing her husband for personal injuries." Even
though most jurisdictions have suspended the immunity under cer-
tain specified circumstances, 28 a significant number of states con-
22. Eg., Freeman, supra note 18, at 96- 101; Parnas, The Police Response to the Domestic
Disturbance, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 915, 955. See generally [1978] 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2205-
206.
23. Reasonable chastizement was permissible. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HIs-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW 436 (2d ed. 1909). Some doubt exists, however, regarding the validity
of the legend that a husband could beat his wife with a stick no thicker than his thumb. W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 136 (4th ed. 1971).
24. See, e.g., Bradley v. State, 2 Miss. (1 Walker) 156 (1824) (a husband has a right to
beat his wife, overruled in Harris v. State, 71 Miss. 464, 14 So. 266 (1894); State v. Oliver, 70
N.C. 60 (1874) (husband who struck wife with a stick the size of his finger would not be guilty
of assault).
25. Eg., Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143 (187 1) (the common law of wife whipping is a low
and barbarous custom and has never been the law of this state); Commonwealth v. McAfee,
108 Mass. 458 (1871) (the right of a man to beat his wife is not conferred by marriage); Harris
v. State, 71 Miss. 464: 14 So. 266 (1894) (the right of a husband to beat his wife receives no
countenance in this state); State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phila. Law) 453 (1868) (the laws of the
state do not recognize the right of the husband to whip his wife). But cf. Echevarria v.
Echevarria, 40 N.Y.2d 262, 386 N.Y.S.2d 653, 353 N.E.2d 565 (1976) (two beatings will not
cause a divorce to be granted).
26. Berberian v. Berberian, 109 R.I. 273, 277, 284 A.2d 72, 74 (1971). See, e.g., Bruno v.
Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 1048, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 975 (1977), rev'd, 64 App. Div. 2d 582, 407
N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978) (for too long Anglo-American law has treated wife-beating as an accepta-
ble practice).
27. No tort action could arise between husband and wife under common law since the
married state was a conceptualistic unity, permitting a wife only to sue or be sued under the
name of her husband. See, e.g., Laughlin v. Eaton, 54 Me. 156 (1866); Dengate v. Gardiner,
150 Eng. Rep. 1320 (Exch. Ch. 1838); Head v. Briscoe, 172 Eng. Rep. 1064 (C.P. 1833). See
generally McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030
(1930); Note, Litigation Between Husband and Wife, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1650 (1966).
28. Many states abrogate the doctrine when the offensive conduct is particularly heinous
or intentional. See, e.g. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978) (husband and two
tinue to bar civil suits between spouses,29some preventing even a
divorced woman from suing her former husband for assaults com-
mitted during coverture.3 ° Although the primal legal identity the-
ory,3' which espoused that the husband and wife were as one, no
longer qualifies as the basis for the doctrine,32 many courts rational-
ize adherence to the doctrine by relying on the public policy of en-
couraging marital felicity.33 Additionally, these courts appreciate
the current potential for collusive suits between married couples,
particularly where insurance claims are involved.34
The strong policy considerations bolstering the doctrine of in-
terspousal immunity should not preclude an abused spouse from su-
ing her husband. Since they are applicable logically only to torts
committed through negligence, these policies appear emasculated
when considering the commission of intentional torts.35 Enabling a
wife to sue an abusive husband for assault and battery would clearly
not disturb seriously an already deteriorated marriage. Nor would it
engender collusive suits, since insurance policies generally cover
negligent but not intentional acts.36 Furthermore, by suing for dam-
ages, a wife could receive the funds necessary for her separate main-
tenance.37
Nationwide abrogation of the doctrine for intentional torts,
though financially salutary for abused spouses, would, nevertheless,
others attempted to rape wife at gunpoint); Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977)
(children had cause of action when husband intentionally and wrongfully caused wife's death
by gunshot). See Comment, Interspousal Tort Immunity, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 291 (1978).
A majority of states have abolished the doctrine altogether. See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 58
Cal. 2d 692, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70 (1962); Silverman v. Silverman, 145 Conn. 663, 145
A.2d 826 (1958); Lewis v. Lewis, 76 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1764, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976); Mosier v.
Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 138 N.W.2d 343 (1965); Morin v. LeTourneau, 102 N.H. 309, 156 A.2d
131 (1959); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978); Weicker v. Weicker, 28
App. Div. 2d 138, 283 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1967); Bodenhagen v. Farmers Mutual Ins. Co., 5 Wis. 2d
306, 95 N.W.2d 822 (1959).
29. See, e.g., Fisher v. Toler, 194 Kan. 701, 401 P.2d 1012 (1965); Moulton v. Moulton,
309 A.2d 224 (Me. 1973); Huff v. LaSieur, 571 S.W.2d 654 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Policino v.
Ehrlich, 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 19, 345 A.2d 224 (1975); Asplin v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co.,-R.I.-,
394 A.2d 1353 (1978).
30. See, e.g., Fisher v. Toler, 194 Kan. 701, 401 P.2d 1012 (1965); Abbott v. Abbott, 67
Me. 304 (1877); Ensminger v. Campbell, 242 Miss. 519, 134 So. 2d 728 (1961); State ex rel
Angvall v. Dist. Ct. of Thirteenth Judicial Dist., In and for County of Yellowstone, 151 Mont.
483, 444 P.2d 370 (1968).
31. During the duration of the marriage the legal identity of the wife was regarded as
suspended and merged into that of her husband. See note 27 supra.
32. See, e.g., Merenoffv. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978).
33. See, e.g., Orefice v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970); Smith v. Smith, 240 Pa. Super.
Ct. 97, 361 A.2d 756 (1976); Asplin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., - R.I. -, 394 A.2d 1353 (1978).
34. See, e.g., Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965). But see Sorensen v.
Sorensen, 75 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3662, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975) (finding these policy arguments
insufficient when considering parental immunity). See generally Casey, The Trend ofInter-
spousal and Parental Immunity - Cakewalk Liability, 45 INs. COUNSEL J. 321 (1978).
35. See, e.g., Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970). See generally 13 DuQ. L.
REV. 156 (1974).
36. R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 286 (1971).
37. BATTERED WIVES, supra note 4, at 103.
be inadequate as a sole remedy. Tort suits, after proven, afford
merely monetary damages, not protection from abuse. An immedi-
ate form of physical protection as well as a financial deterrent is
needed in a turbulent domestic atmosphere. Consequently, a com-
prehensive statutory remedy is necessary.
III. General Statutory Remedies
Statutory remedies dispelling the effects of the common law
have been enacted in most states to protect battered spouses. Specifi-
cally, three general types of statutory schemes are discernible: extra-
judicial enactments, penal code provisions, and civil remedies.
Individually, no scheme has proved totally successful; in combina-
tion, however, the schemes could prove viable.38
A. Extrajudicial Remedy
Shelters, the major form of extrajudicial remedy, are intended
to protect an abused wife who has children by providing her with
immediate, temporary lodging, medical aid, and assistance in locat-
ing employment. 39 Additionally, these havens are designed to reha-
bilitate a woman and offer emotional support and counseling
services.' Ideally, this assistance should be available to any abused
woman. Currently, since most shelters are privately funded4 and
receive negligible federal or state support,42 they provide only a
38. Pennsylvania has enacted a civil protection from abuse act, which is to be enforced
by a criminal contempt sanction. See discussion at Part IV infra.
39. For a comprehensive discussion of the genesis and development of shelters, concen-
trating on the services generally available, see BATTERED WIVES, supra note 4, at 196-253.
40. Shelter organizations are generally in close contact with community agencies, partic-
ularly legal services, mental health centers, and police departments. Some shelters have de-
vised systems with legal assistance agencies, allowing an abused woman to be seen on an
emergency basis. 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 359 (written presentation of C.
Beardslee). Other shelter groups offer additional assistance, including operating a counseling
service within the district attorney's office. Id at 373 (written presentation of J. Fleming).
41. Even though havens for battered women have been in existence since 1965, they gen-
erally lack facilities capable of dealing with the numbers of women seeking help. An average
shelter, for example, houses only thirty women. NEWSLETTER, COLORADO ASS'N FOR AID TO
BATTERED WOMEN, Denver, Colo. (on file in office of Dickinson Law Review).
42. Until recently, the federal response to abused women seeking protection was grossly
inadequate. No federal program provided specific assistance, a deficiency compounded by the
inability of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to provide aid.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 636-40. Furthermore, federal legislation for a
Domestic Violence Assistance Act (H.R. 12299) was defeated in May 1978. Reasons given for
the failure of the bill, which would have authorized appropriations both to support local pro-
grams and to coordinate a federal clearinghouse for information, were a lack of federal nexus
and a dearth of finances. [1978] 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2455.
The potential for federal assistance exists, however, when authorized through existing
agencies. HUD has stated that its Community Development Block Program could be utilized
to support shelters. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 649. Furthermore, Senators
Anderson and Kennedy have proposed a bill (S. 1728) that would enable the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare to establish a grant program designed to develop methods of
prevention and treatment relating to domestic violence. See 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note
2, at 170-77.
modicum of aid. Many women are routinely turned away because of
limited facilities. 3
Recognizing the inadequacy of private shelters various states
have actively attempted to ameliorate a battered woman's plight by
statutorily establishing model shelter homes.' California 45 has one
of the more progressive statutes that addresses both present and fu-
ture spouse abuse. In an attempt to aid women who have been as-
saulted and to reduce the potential for fatal injuries, California has
provided for the initiation of demonstration shelter projects and the
collection of data relevant to isolating causes of familial violence.
Specifically, the enactment appropriates seed money for the estab-
lishment of four to six project centers. 6 Basic services provided by
these centers include temporary housing, psychological support, re-
ferrals to community programs, and emergency transportation to the
shelter. 7 Additionally, an innovative incorporation of follow-up
services with data collection schemes facilitates evaluation of the
program. 8
Even though federal and state supported shelter services could
play a vital role in protecting and rehabilitating women who flee
from abusive husbands, they present only a partial solution. A legal
remedy is equally necessary to affect the source of the problem, par-
ticularly for women who require physical protection but prefer to
remain at home.
B. Penal Codes
Theoretically, assaulted wives have statutory protection under
some state penal code provisions covering assault, assault and bat-
tery, aggravated assault, and assault with intent to commit murder. 9
Since the only generally recognized legal defense to an assault-type
43. In 1978, Denver agencies serving battered women turned away 1,035 women. NEws-
LETTER, COLORADO ASS'N FOR AID TO BATTERED WOMEN, Denver, Colo. (on file in office of
Dickinson Law Review).
44. E.g., 1977 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 892, §§ 18290-18303 (West); MD. ANN. CODE art.
88A, § 103 (1977); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 647 (West 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.62
(West 1978); Oregon SB 769 c.846 (1977) (to be codified).
Maryland's statute, for example, authorizes the Secretary of Human Resources to estab-
lish and maintain a model shelter home, the purpose of which is to provide housing, care, and
counseling for the rehabilitation of the battered spouse. Half of the funds for the home are
furnished by the state, while the remainder is to be provided by service charges and contribu-
tions. If a woman is unable to pay, fees may be waived. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 103
(1977).
45. 1977 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 892, §§ 18290-18303 (West).
46. The sum of $280,000 is appropriated, $250,000 of which is to fund four to six pilot
projects and $30,000 of which is to pay professional staff. Id § 18303(2)(a)(b).
47. Id § 18294. Because shelters serve a variety of cultural backgrounds, the personnel
of the program shall be bilingual. Id. § 18298.
48. 1d §§ 18300-18303.
49. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.81-82 (1970); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2701-
2702, 2705 (Purdon 1973).
offense is self-defense,5 ° spouse abuse should be punishable as a
crime.
In reality, however, a battered wife is afforded only superficial
protection by the police and by the courts. First, a battered wife
seeking protection and assistance from the police encounters their
general reluctance to treat spouse assault as criminal, an attitude re-
flective of a whole non-interventionist and dilatory training policy.5
When the police answer an abused woman's distress calls,5 2 they
usually avoid arresting the offending husband and instead encourage
reconciliation by unduly emphasizing the disadvantages of prosecu-
tion.53 Second, procedural safeguards afforded an arrestee to protect
his constitutional rights often preclude the immediate protection of
the battered wife. In most jurisdictions spouse abuse qualifies as a
misdemeanor offense,5 4 and a police officer can make a warrantless
arrest only if the misdemeanor was committed in his presence.
5
Last, the battered spouse receives little active support from the
courts, which formulate conciliatory rather than punitive solutions.
50. E.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505 (Purdon 1973). See also W. LAFAVE AND A.
SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 608 (1972).
51. In policy, the police adopt a social rather than an enforcement role. Included in an
Ann Arbor, Michigan, Police Training Academy outline for handling domestic calls, for exam-
ple, are procedures for avoiding arrest by appealing to vanity, explaining the lengthy proce-
dures for obtaining a warrant, and recommending a postponement. The Sef-Defense Plea,
supra note 4, at 36. For a detailed study of non-interventionist police procedures see Parnas,
The Police Response to the Domestic Disturbance, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 914. See generaly Fields,
Does This Vow Include Wife Beating?. 7 HUMAN RIGHTS No. 2, 40 (1978).
52. Police dispatchers screening calls often relegate those alleging spouse abuse to a low
priority. Thus, police often respond only to repeated calls. See BATTERED WIVES, supra note
4, at 92-93.
53. Police manuals suggest that officers emphasize the following: (a) complainant must
sign a complaint, (b) complainant must appear in court, (c) substantial time will be lost, and
(d) court costs are high. Self-Defense Plea, supra note 4, at 36.
54. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.81 (1970). For an examination of Michigan's
criminal laws applicable to punishing spouse abuse, see Buzawa & Buzawa, Legislative Re-
sponses to the Problem o/Domestic Violence in Michigan, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 859 (1979); As-
saulted W!fe, supra note 6.
In Pennsylvania, many forms of spouse abuse would constitute misdemeanors, since the
simple assault statute reads:
(a) Offense defined.-A person is guilty of assault if he:
(I) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily in-
jury to another;
(2) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; or
(3) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bod-
ily injury.
(b) Grading.-Simple assault is a misdemeanor of the second degree unless commit-
ted in a fight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in which case it is a misde-
meanor of the third degree.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2701 (Purdon 1973). See generally Note, The Protection From
Abuse Act, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 116 (1978). California however, has made spouse abuse a felony.
See note 60 infra.
55. E.g., Commonwealth v. Chapack, 24 Luz. 513 (Pa. C.P. 1927). Additionally, for a
warrant to be issued, an abused woman must first file a written complaint with a district justice
or district attorney. In many states screening processes utilized by prosecutors discourage vic-
tims from prosecuting. Comment, Wife Abuse." The Failure of Legal Remedies, I I J. MAR.
PRAC. & PROC. 549, 563-64 (1978) [hereinafter W!feAbusel.
Statistics reveal that an accused husband is frequently admonished
but seldom convicted or sentenced. 56 Presumably, judges are anx-
ious to reunite the family unit and view domestic violence as a civil
rather than criminal offense.57
The refusal of the police and the judiciary to afford protection
to victims of spouse abuse can have serious, often fatal repercus-
sions. Numerous counselors have observed that once a pattern of
abuse is established it increases in frequency and in severity, 58 possi-
bly resulting in the eventual murder of the victim.59
As an attempt to overcome these non-interventionist policies
California has made spouse abuse a specific statutory felony.6° De-
spite the codification of spouse abuse as a specific felony, however,
California's criminal law remedy for victims of abuse appears vul-
nerable to police and judicial conciliatory tactics.6 1 Particularly,
judges remain reluctant to sentence an abusive husband,62 a predis-
position exaggerated by the legal requirement of establishing a
"traumatic condition" from evidence that rapidly disappears.63 Sta-
tistics reiterate the dilemma faced by abused spouses. Since fewer
56. Parnas, Judicial Response to lntra-Famiy Violence, 54 MINN. L. REV. 585, 609-10
(1970). Methods generally employed by judges at hearings to deal with domestic violence are
an authoritative reprimand, a peace bond as security against future breach of the peace, and
referral to social service agencies. Id at 598-609.
57. Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (right to marry is part of funda-
mental "right of privacy" implicit in the fourteenth amendment's due process clause); Cleve-
land Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) ("This Court has long recognized
that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (marriage involves a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights).
58. Gates, Victims ofRape and Wfe Abuse, in WOMEN IN THE COURTS, 186-97 (1978).
59. In 1975, spouse murders totalled 11.5% of all homicides reported. 1975 UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS 18-19.
60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (West Supp. 1979).
Currently, any husband who willfully inflicts corporal injury resulting in a traumatic con-
dition upon his wife is guilty of a felony, punishable by incarceration in the state prison or
county jail for up to one year. Additionally, husband abuse, child abuse, and traumatically
injuring someone of the opposite sex with whom one is living are statutorily proscribed. Id
Prior to the addition of this provision in 1977, however, the punishment was imprison-
ment for up to ten years and only wife beating was addressed. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273d
(West 1970). Ostensibly to avoid equal protection challenges, coverage of the statute was ex-
tended to husbands and unmarried couples. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (West Supp. 1979).
See BATTERED WIVES, supra note 4, at 100-01. But see People v. Cameron, 53 Cal. App. 3d
786, 126 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1975) (statute protecting only wives is not violative of equal protection).
The infliction of a traumatic condition is a legal conception, generally defined as the pro-
duction of an abnormal bodily condition by wound or injury. See, e.g., People v. Bums, 88
Cal. App. 2d 867, 873, 200 P.2d 134, 138 (1948) ("traumatic condition" is a technical term, the
meaning of which is not within the knowledge ofjurors).
61. See Truninger, Marital Violence- The Legal Solutions, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 259, 262-64
(1971).
62. See, e.g., People v. Bums, 88 Cal. App. 2d 867, 200 P.2d 134 (1948). For a descrip-
tion of police reluctance to arrest, even with probable cause, in domestic assault cases see
WOMEN IN THE COURTS, supra note 14, at 195.
63. Some women are beaten in generally unexposed areas of their bodies. Wfe Abuse,
supra note 55, at 559 n.61.
than one in six felony arrests for wife or child beatings results in
conviction and the incidence of familial violence remains high,64 the
statute has little deterrent effect. Thus, statutorily proscribing spouse
abuse appears an imperfect solution to the problem.
Undoubtedly, an abused woman should be afforded the undi-
luted protection of the criminal law with incarceration of her attack-
er a real possibility. Even if penal code provisions enabled spouse
abuse victims to prosecute their attackers satisfactorily, however, a
criminal statute should not be an exclusive remedy. The woman
who prefers not to prosecute for financial or personal reasons,65 but
who requires immediate and adequate legal protection, must have a
viable civil alternative available.
C. Civil Remedies
Some states offer a civil alternative, a form of injunctive relief,
to abused women who prefer not to prosecute their husbands but
who, nevertheless, require immediate protection. The relief, a pro-
tective order issued by the court, commands an assailant to cease and
desist from abusive conduct.6 6 Although injunctions appear a viable
alternative to criminal sanctions, they can lack effectiveness.
In states that specifically condition relief on filing for divorce,
the civil remedy is defective.67 Even though grounds for divorce
may be established by evidence of physical cruelty,68 the potential
for subjecting the woman to further violence is inherent. In order to
establish legal fault, physical assault must be extreme and re-
peated.69 Thus, a woman must suffer considerable abuse before she
is afforded relief. Moreover, by conditioning relief on filing for di-
vorce those states preclude from protection unmarried women7 ° and
married women who do not wish to be permanently separated from
the sanctity of their homes and the mental and financial security of
64. 1978 Senate Hearings, supra note 2, at 18-20
65. See note 89 infra.
66. A protective order sets forth reasonable and enforceable types of behavior and is
immediately enforceable. Upon violation of an order, the protected party may obtain assist-
ance from the police. For an examination of the uses of these orders, see 2 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROB. 164 (1966).
67. States without specific civil statutes proscribing spouse abuse generally condition the
issuance of injunctive relief on filing for divorce. For a list of some of the states with civil
statutes, see note 72 infra.
68. Physical cruelty would generally constitute grounds for divorce. Currently, however,
a trend away from "fault only" divorces is discernible. Presumably, in no-fault states divorce
would be more immediately obtainable. See generally Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Ffty
States: An Outline, II FAM. L.Q. 297 (1977).
69. See, e.g., Tuyls v. Tuyls, 21 111. 2d 192, 171 N.E.2d 779 (1961) (spouse must prove at
least two previous occasions of physical violence by preponderance of evidence to be granted a
divorce); Echevarria v. Echevarria, 40 N.Y.2d 262, 353 N.E.2d 565, 386 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1976)
(two beatings will not cause a divorce to be granted).
70. See note 102 infra.
their companions.7
Several states, including Pennsylvania, have adopted legislative
measures that make spouse abuse a specific civil offense, remediable
by injunctive relief.72 The New York legislature, believing that a
criminal court is unable to provide adequate protection, 73 has cre-
ated a family court to deal with family violence.74 This court is au-
thorized to enter orders of protection and support as well as to
consider conciliation proceedings.75
Although civil statutes similar to New York's purportedly afford
a battered woman substantial forms of relief, they have been se-
verely criticized for their ineffectiveness. First, coverage is often lim-
ited to married persons,76 which excludes single couples living
together. Second, lack of state funding and overcrowded dockets
prevent any proffer of immediate relief.77 Third, even when protec-
tive orders are issued police are reluctant to enforce them.78 Only
Massachusetts has a statute79 that establishes an affirmative duty
upon the police to assist abused spouses and to inform them of their
rights and available remedies.8" Last, most civil statutes are indefi-
71. Psychological pressures, based on the belief that a woman should make her husband
happy, encourage women to preserve their marriages. Additionally, financial dependency
often precludes divorce, particularly since few women are actually granted alimony. Wfe
Abuse, supra note 55, at 553 n.21.
72. See, e.g., 1977 Conn. Legis. Serv. Pub. Act No. 77-336; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 69, § 25
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.874(l) (Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§§ 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN LAWS § 11-5-9 (Supp. 1978).
73. For additional reasons for the adoption of the Act see N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT Art. 1,
Practice Commentaries (29A McKinney 1975).
74. Id at§§ 1I1-1120.
75. Id. at § 841,913. Protection orders can be broad, ranging from a command to refrain
from visiting the house, spouse, or child to awarding custody of the child to either parent. Id.
at § 841. Violation of an order is punishable as contempt of court. Id at § 846.
Even though the statute impliedly permits the issuance of either civil or criminal contempt
citations the former is generally invoked. For a discussion on the distinction between civil and
criminal contempt see notes 127-34 and accompanying text infra. See BATTERED WIVES, supra
note 4, at 106-09.
76. See, e.g., Potter v. Bennett, 40 App. Div. 2d 546, 334 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1972); People v.
Allen, 27 N.Y.2d 108, 261 N.E.2d 637, 313 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1970); People v. Ostrander, 58 Misc.
2d 383, 295 N.Y.S.2d 293 (Dutchess County Ct. 1968). But see People v. James, 55 Misc. 2d
953, 287 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
77. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT, Art. I, Practice Commentaries (29A McKinney 1975).
78. See, e.g., Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1977), rev'd, 64 App.
Div. 2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978) (class action on behalf of twelve battered women, alleg-
ing police failed to fulfill their duties);Baker v. City of New York, 25 App. Div. 2d 770, 269
N.Y.S.2d 515 (1966) (wife alleged that police officers refused to take action against abusive
husband).
79. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A §§ 1-6 (West Supp. 1979).
80. In addition to remaining on the scene as long as there is danger and assisting an
abused person in obtaining medical aid, the police must give the person a copy of the follow-
ing statement written in English and Spanish:
You have the right to go to the district, probate or superior court and file a
complaint requesting any of the following applicable orders for temporary relief: (a)
an order restraining your attacker from abusing you; (b) an order directing your at-
tacker to leave your household; (c) an order awarding you custody of a minor child;
(d) an order directing your attacker to pay support for you or any minor child in your
custody if the attacker has a legal obligation to support them; and (e) an order di-
nite in regards to the nature of their contempt provisions, 8I even
though these sanctions are the crux of enforcing civil remedies.82
IV. Pennsylvania's Protection from Abuse Act
Instead of merely imitating statutory remedies adopted by other
states,83 the Pennsylvania legislature has attempted to formulate a
more comprehensive scheme with the Protection from Abuse Act of
197684 and the 1978 amendments to the Act. 85 Although both enact-
ments are vulnerable to criticism, each demonstrates greater strength
and potential for improvement than precursory legislation of other
states. With procedural clarification and further amendment8 6 Penn-
sylvania's Act could yield a viable solution to the problem of spouse
abuse.
A. The 1976 Act
Staunch political sponsorship and strong lobbying by legal serv-
ice offices seeking to provide statutory relief for victims of domestic
violence87 resulted in Pennsylvania's adoption of the Protection from
recting your attacker to pay you for losses suffered as a result of the abuse, including
medical and moving expenses, loss of earnings or support, attorney fees and other
out-of-pocket losses for injuries sustained.
You have the right to go to district court and file a criminal complaint for
threats, assault and battery, assault with a deadly weapon, assault with intent to kill
or other related crimes. You may go to district court for an emergency on weekends
or holidays.
If you are in need of medical treatment, you have the right to demand that the
officer present drive you to the nearest hospital or otherwise assist you.
If you believe that police protection is needed for your physical safety, you have
the right to demand that the officer present remain at the scene until you and your
children can leave or until your safety is otherwise insured.
1d. § 6.
81. State statutes may fail to state whether criminal or civil contempt proceedings will be
implemented for violation of protective orders. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 156 (29A Mc-
Kinney 1975).
82. See notes 126-37 and accompanying text infra.
83. Drafters of the Act did use the New York Family Court Law as a guide. An attorney
from Brooklyn Legal Services testified on the operation of the New York Statute before the
Pennsylvania Senate Judiciary Committee in Harrisburg, Pa., May 11, 1976, while the Com-
mittee was studying the Pennsylvania bill. Note, Relieffor Victims of Intra-Family Assaults -
The Pennsylvania ProtectionfromAbuseAct, 81 DICK. L. REV. 815, 818 n.27 (hereinafter cited
as Relieffor Victims]. See generally N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812 (29A McKinney 1975).
Major innovations, however, were included in Pennsylvania's Act, providing more com-
prehensive protection than legislation of other states. See notes 102-07 and accompanying text
infra.
84. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977).
85. Act of June 23, 1978, P.L. -, No. 812, amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10181-
10190 (Purdon 1977).
86. See discussion at Part V infra.
87. State Senator Hill became interested in the problem of abuse after speaking with
Philadelphia Community Legal Services. Subsequently, the senator and several of his fellow
committee members agreed to sponsor protective legislation and lobby for its passage. Senate
Bill 1243, the Protection from Abuse Act, was introduced by Senators Hill, Howard, Myers,
and Jubelirer on December 10, 1975. G. Aul, The Protection from Abuse Act of Pennsylvania
(Nov. 1976) (unpublished paper in the Dickinson School of Law Legislative Clinic Library).
Abuse Act in October of 1976.88 Recognizing the right to initiate
criminal prosecution as a sole remedy is inadequate, particularly for
a spouse initially seeking protection rather than the incarceration of
her husband,8 9 the Pennsylvania legislature fashioned a civil pro-
ceeding for the immediate protection of family or household mem-
bers.9" Included under the statutory rubric are wives, husbands,
unmarried couples living together, children, and persons related by
consanquinity or affinity to persons with whom they reside.9
Without eliminating criminal sanctions,92 the Act affords a bat-
tered person three basic forms of civil relief, which assuages the ef-
fects of Pennsylvania's adherence to the doctrine of interspousal
immunity.93 Specifically, the enactment provides quick relief for vic-
tims of intentional, knowing or reckless acts that cause bodily injury;
place another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury; and sexually
abuse minor children.94 The filing of a civil petition with the court
requires that a hearing be held within ten days, at which time the
plaintiff, in order to be granted relief, must prove the alleged abuse
by a preponderance of the evidence.95
The enumerated tripartite relief, which is to be incorporated
into protective orders or consent agreements, 96 may direct the de-
fendant to refrain from abusing the plaintiff or minor children;
award temporary custody of and/or establish temporary visitation
rights involving minor children and evict the defendant from the
88. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977). For an account of the legisla-
tive history of Senate Bill 1243 and an excellent discussion of the Act see Relieffor Victims,
supra note 83.
89. Initiating criminal sanctions could be financially disastrous for a battered wife, since
it might require that bail be posted by the family and could eventually lead to the husband's
incarceration, which terminates a necessary source of income.
An alternative to criminal sanctions at the time of the enactment was the technically per-
missible use of peace bonds. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 23 (Purdon 1964). The constitutionality
of the quasi-criminal bonds, however, was doubtful. Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (im-
prisonment of an indigent for his inability to pay traffic fines was violative of equal protection).
See, Relief For Victims, supra note 83, at 815 n.4.
Peace bonds no longer provide an alternative to criminal sanctions in Pennsylvania: their
use was repealed by Judicial Code of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, No. 142 as amended by Act of
April 28, 1978, P.L. 202, No. 1978-53, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (1978 Pamphlet, Pt. 2).
90. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10182 (Purdon 1977).
91. 1d
92. The Act specifies that "[any proceeding... shall be in accordance with the Rules of
Civil Procedure and shall be in addition to any other available civil or criminal remedies." Id.
§ 10189.
93. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § I Il (Purdon 1965). Even though an abused wife may not
sue her husband in tort for damages, she may receive a more immediate form of physical
protection, a protective order.
94. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10182(i)-(iii) (Purdon 1977). See also the Child Protective
Services Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2201-2204 (Purdon Supp. 1979); Note, The Penn-
sylvania Child Protective Services Law, 81 DICK. L. REv. 823 (1977).
95. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10185 (Purdon 1977).
96. Protective orders are orders issued by the court for the protection of the plaintiff,
while consent agreements are agreements prepared by the parties and consented to by the
court. For an example of a consent decree, obligating the New York City police to arrest men
who abuse their wives, see [1978] 4 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3095-96.
household, regardless of whether the property is owned or leased
jointly by the couple or solely by the husband.97 Furthermore, a re-
lief order, which may be implemented for a maximum period of one
year, can be amended by the court at any time upon subsequent
filing by either party.98 For violation of an existing order or agree-
ment, the defendant may be held in contempt of court.99
Both to preclude police noninvolvement through lack of official
notice and to more fully protect a spouse from abuse, the Act in-
cludes provisions dealing with notification and emergency relief.
Specifically, a copy of an order will be issued to all parties, as well as
the police department with appropriate jurisdiction.' 00 Emergency
relief, lasting up to seventy-two hours, is obtainable on weekends
through a district justice. Moreover, any of the forms of tripartite
statutory relief may be granted by the district justice in an ex parte
proceeding when there is immediate and present danger of abuse to
the plaintiff or minor children.' 0 '
Examination of the Act reveals its novelty. First, the expansive
coverage, ranging from grandparents to unmarried couples living to-
gether, 10 2 is responsive to the needs of a modern society. Moreover,
in contrast to other statutory schemes protecting only wives, 0 3 the
Act obviates possible equal protection challenges of sex-based dis-
crimination. Second, the eviction order is a form of relief unique to
the Act. "o Third, even though a civil remedy is provided, the Act in
no way limits the right to prosecute criminally; the civil proceeding is
intended only as an additional remedy, providing more immediate
protection. 05 Last, by specifying that the plaintiff's right to relief is
unaffected by his or her leaving the household to avoid further
97. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10186(a)(I)-(4) (Purdon 1977). No form of relief, however,
will affect title to real property in any manner. Id § 10186(c).
98. 1d § 10186(b).
99. Id § 10190. See notes 124-25 and accompanying text infra.
100. 1d § 10187. Under this procedure the police are notified of the existence of the order
and the potential for further violence.
101. Id § 10188(a). Any order issued as ex parte relief expires with the resumption of
court business or within seventy-two hours, whichever occurs sooner. Id. § 10188(b). Any
documentation and order issued ex parte shall be immediately certified to the court. 1d.
§ 10188(c).
102. Coverage of the Pennsylvania act is not restricted to wives. By definition, the Act
covers family or household members who reside together, a group that encompasses "spouses,
persons living as spouses, parents, and children, or other persons related by consanguinity or
affinity." Id § 10182.
103. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273d (West 1970). At the time of original enactment
the expansiveness of Pennsylvania's act was novel. Since 1976, however, other state statutes
covering wife-beating have been similarly extended. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5
(West Supp. 1979); 1977 Conn. Legis. Serv. Pub. Act No. 77-336; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.15
(West Supp. 1979); R.I. GEN LAWS § 11-5-9 (1978 Supp.).
104. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.874(I) (Supp. 1979). See also Relieffor Victims,
supra note 83, at 819. Since 1976, other states have adopted ex parte evict provisions similar to
Pennsylvania's. See, e.g., 1977 Conn. Legis. Serv. Pub. Act No. 77-336.
105. See note 92 supra.
abuse,' 06 the Act enables an abused spouse to seek concomitant pro-
tection from shelter services without forfeiting rights under the Act.
Since many abused persons are unaware of their legal rights until
informed of them by shelter service personnel, this provision is cru-
cial. 107
Several weaknesses of the Act, most of which stem from a lack
of procedural specificity, however, do exist. Notably, the ex parte
relief section 0 8 is vulnerable to attack on procedural due process
grounds. A defendant evicted under the emergency relief section is
denied both notice and an opportunity to be heard. 0 9 Procedural
clarification, defining immediate and present danger of abuse, would
obviate due process challenges.'" Under the most exigent circum-
stances, the issuance of ex parte relief, like the granting of a tempo-
rary restraining order,'' is permissible. Thus, the compelling
interest of protecting the plaintiff can constitutionally suspend a de-
fendant's right to due process.'l2
Secondly, the Act originally made no provision for support or
the continued payment of rent or mortgage upon a defendant's evic-
tion.' "I This omission created the possibility that a plaintiff would
not seek an eviction because of his dependency upon the defendant
to make these payments. In addition, the contempt sanction lacked
effectiveness, neglecting to state whether civil or criminal contempt
of court would be charged."' Thus, even though the police were
officially notified of an order or an agreement, they were not specifi-
cally empowered to arrest the defendant for a definite violation.
I 5
B. The 1978 Amendments
In an attempt to strengthen the enforcement of the Protection
from Abuse Act, the Pennsylvania legislature adopted numerous
amendments" 6 that clarify and extend the coverage of the Act.
Nearly every provision is expanded to cover potential situations ade-
106. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10183 (Purdon 1977).
107. See notes 39-48 and accompanying text supra.
108. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10188 (Purdon 1977).
109. See, e.g., North Ga. Finishing v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
110. New York follows a similar scheme, issuing a refrain from abuse order before issuing
the evict order. Relieffor Victims, supra note 83 at 818.
111. A temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte when there is a compelling
need for injunctive relief. Among the safeguards employed is a ten day duration limitation.
D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 107-08 (1973).
112. See, e.g., In re Martorano, 464 Pa. 66, 346 A.2d 22 (1975) (due process depends on
the circumstances of each case); Commonwealth v. Mayberry, 459 Pa. 91, 327 A.2d 86 (1974)
(due process is a flexible concept).
113. See note 121 and accompanying text infra.
114. See notes 126-36 and accompanying text infra.
115. See note 137 and accompanying text infra.
116. Act of June 23, 1978, P.L. __, No. 81, amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10181-
10190 (Purdon 1977).
quately. Even though the additions are significant, however, some
further amendment and clarification is necessary,' particularly for
the effective enforcement of the contempt provision.
Generally, the amendments greatly enlarge the scope of the Act.
First, the definition of abuse has been broadened to include parties
who formerly resided together and continue to have legal access to
the residence." 8 Second, if the plaintiff submits an affidavit claiming
indigency, the petition will be filed and served in forma pauperis
before such status is legally determined." 9  Third, the relief provi-
sion, permitting eviction of the defendant from the premises, has
been amended to include property owned or leased by the entireties
or solely by the plaintiff. 2° Fourth, as an additional measure of re-
lief the court may order the defendant to pay temporary support to
the plaintiff,'2 ' which precludes the plaintiffs need to vacate the
home for financial reasons. The temporary order becomes void, 1
22
however, if the plaintiff fails to file a petition within two weeks under
the Procedural Support Act.' 23 Last, the contempt provision specifi-
cally authorizes criminal sanctions for violation of court orders. Vi-
olation of any protection order or court approved consent agreement
constitutes indirect criminal contempt and carries no right to trial by
jury. 124 A warrantless arrest for violation of an order may be made
upon probable cause, irrespective of whether the violation was com-
mitted in the presence of the police officer.' 25 The creative expan-
117. See notes 139-40 and accompanying text infra.
118. Thus, the Act now encompasses separated couples, a group previously excluded,
under the protection from abuse ambit. Act of June 23, 1978, P.L. -, No. 81, § 2, amending
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977).
119. Id at § 4(b). For expediency, the hearing to determine indigency will be held con-
temporaneously with the hearing on the petition. By providing that the court can first effect
filing and subsequently order the plaintiff to pay costs if indigency is not found, the Act per-
mits faster service and relief. Id
120. Id. § 6(a)(2). Since the Act originally listed only property controlled jointly or solely
by the husband, any possible confusion regarding the right to evict a defendant from a wife's
property is obviated.
121. Act of June 23, 1978, P.L. _, No. 81, § 6(a)(5), amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§§ 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977).
122. Id.
123. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2043.31.
124. Act of June 23, 1978, P.L. -, No. 81, § 10(a), amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§§ 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977). Punishment for indirect criminal contempt may include im-
prisonment up to six months or a fine not to exceed $1000 or both. Furthermore, -the defend-
ant has no right to a jury trial. Id § 10(b).
The punishment prescribed by Pennsylvania's act for indirect criminal contempt repre-
sents a substantially harsher penalty than that generally mandated by state law. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17, § 2047 (Purdon 1962). The high penalties are consistent though with those pro-
vided for violation of support orders. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6766 (Purdon Pamph.
1979). See Barrett v. Barrett, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 590, 352 A.2d 74 (1975).
The denial of a jury trial for imprisonment up to six months has been upheld as constitu-
tional. See, e.g., Inre Martorano, 464 Pa. 66, 346 A.2d 22 (1975). Accord, Codispoti v. Penn-
sylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 514 (1974).
125. Act of June 23, 1978, P.L. -, No. 81, § 10(c), amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§§ 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977).
sion of the contempt provision is an innovation deserving detailed
examination.
V. Analysis of the Contempt Provision
A. The Applicability of Criminal Sanctions
Two distinct types of contempt proceedings, criminal and civil,
evolved under early common law, but original distinctions in pur-
pose and punishment have gradually been refined, culminating in a
theoretical dichotomy. 26 Arguably, either type of contempt proceed-
ing, or a combination of the two, would provide an appropriate rem-
edy for violation of a court's protective order. Examination,
however, shows Pennsylvania's use of criminal contempt sanctions to
be the sounder choice.
1. Criminal Contempt.--Criminal contempt proceedings are
punitive in nature, imposed to vindicate the authority of the court. ,
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The imposition of criminal contempt for disregard of a court's pro-
tective order is, therefore, theoretically sound, since the violation is
an affront to the dignity of the court.
Furthermore, applying the fundamental test enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co. 128 for distin-
guishing between the two types of contempt, a criminal contempt
sanction appears suitable for punishing disobedience. In resolving a
labor dispute the Court opined:
[I]mprisonment for civil contempt is ordered where the defendant
has refused to do an affirmative act required by the provisions of
an order which, either in form or substance, was mandatory in its
character.
On the other hand, if the defendant does that which he has
been commanded not to do, the disobedience is a thing accom-
plished. Imprisonment cannot undo or remedy what has been
done . . . [and in such a case] imprisonment operates, not as a
126. For a history and an analysis of the early contempt power, see C. THOMAS,
PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT: A STUDY IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY (1934). Seegener-
ally Beale, Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 HARV. L. REV. 161 (1908).
127. See, e.g., Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); Woods v.
Dunlop, 461 Pa. 35, 334 A.2d 619 (1975).
Two basic types of contumacious behavior, direct and indirect affronts to the dignity of
the court, constitute criminal contempt. Direct contempt, consisting of doing a proscribed act
in the very presence of the court is summarily punishable, while indirect contempt, occurring
outside the courtroom, requires a hearing conducted according to rules of criminal procedure
for the adjudication of guilt. See, e.g., Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 392 Pa. 500, 140 A.2d 814 (1958); Rosenberg Appeal, 186 Pa. Super.
Ct. 509, 142 A.2d 449 (1958). Punishment prescribed for either type of contempt is payment of
a set fine and/or imprisonment for a definite duration. See, e.g., Philadelphia County Election
Bd. v. Rader, 162 Pa. Super. Ct. 499, 58 A.2d 187 (1948). For an excellent and thorough
discussion of contempt, including the types of punishment that can be meted out, see Dobbs,
Contempt of Court.- A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 267-82 (1971).
128. 221 U.S. 418 (1911).
remedy coercive in its nature, but solely as punishment for the
completed act of disobedience.1
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Thus, whether an affirmative act of disobedience or a mere refusal to
act has occurred is determinative of the proceeding. Accordingly, an
affirmative violation of a court order would constitute a criminal
form of contempt.
2. Civil Contempt.-In contrast, civil contempt proceedings are
remedial in nature, designed to coerce a party to do something for
the benefit of the complainant.' 3' Even though the use of a civil
proceeding for violation of a protective order appears incompatible
with the Gompers "affirmative act versus omission to act" test, it is
consistent with the theoretical basis for the test. Theoretically, a pu-
nitive sanction is necessary when a proscribed act has been accom-
plished, leaving nothing to coerce. When the possibility of further
violation exists, however, a civil sanction compelling future compli-
ance appears appropriate. Thus, instead of punishing a defendant
criminally for the commission of a prohibited act, the court could
coerce affirmative obedience. '
3'
3. Effects of Utilizing Either Sanction.-Because of the inher-
ently diverse purposes of and the discordant procedural rules for
criminal and civil contempt proceedings, implementation of either
sanction would dissimilarly affect enforcement of the Act. An assur-
ance of continuous police protection rather than a reliance on the
weaker aegis of the sheriff is a major advantage in applying a crimi-
nal sanction. Juxtaposed against this assurance of stronger protec-
tion is the potential for swifter and more effective relief afforded by a
civil proceeding. Theoretically, a defendant could be incarcerated
almost immediately for civil contempt, his indeterminate sentence
conditioned upon his eventual compliance with the protective order.
A major disadvantage to applying criminal sanctions is the opportu-
nity granted a defendant for pretrial release, 32 a procedure that
could seriously endanger the plaintiff during the interim. A civil
proceeding would afford no better protection, however, since civil
incarceration is generally used only to coerce affirmative action, not
129. Id at 442-43.
130. See, e.g., Woods v. Dunlop, 461 Pa. 35, 334 A.2d 619 (1975). Refusal to perform an
act commanded by the court usually occasions the use of the civil sanction. Punishment is
generally an indefinite prison sentence, terminable upon the respondent's willingness to com-
ply with the court's order. See, e.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 365, 335 A.2d
764 (1975).
131. Generally, a court invokes civil contempt proceedings to coerce future affirmative
action, such as payment of support. See, e.g., Barrett v. Barrett, 237 Pa. Super. Ct. 590, 352
A.2d 74 (1975), rev'd., 470 Pa. 253, 368 A.2d 616 (1977).
132. The eighth amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIll.
to deter from future action.' 33 Whether a combined criminal and
civil proceeding could overcome the practical obstacles must, there-
fore, be considered.
4. A Novel Possibility.-When compared to the regulation of
labor strikes a civil remedy seems viable. These civil contempt pro-
ceedings coerce not only affirmative action, but also agreements to
refrain from action. Specifically, in Jencks v. Goforth, 1' the New
Mexico Supreme Court upheld a ninety-day term of imprisonment,
suspended until further violation of a temporary restraining order, as
a civil remedy for violation of an injunction. Thus, conditioning
punishment upon future compliance with a court order could compel
continued nonaction. Although a conditional decree invoked under
a civil contempt power could provide swift relief, the relief could
prove less effective than that afforded under a criminal sanction. In
addition to releasing a defendant conditionally, a civil sanction lacks
the potential for strong police enforcement.
5. A Combination of Criminal and Civil Contempt.-A second
alternative to criminal contempt is discernible upon analogy to the
unique resolution of labor disputes, in which the adjudication of
criminal and civil contempt may occur within the same proceeding.
In these cases certain acts simultaneously violate a court order, indi-
cating a need for a criminal punishment, and endanger the com-
plainant, suggesting a remedy of civil contempt. In dealing with the
violation of a temporary restraining order, an act susceptible of ei-
ther sanction, the Court in United States v. UMW 35 permitted a
mingling of criminal and civil contempt proceedings, an action that
resulted in the imposition of determinate and conditional punish-
ment. If a combined proceeding represents convenient practice, re-
sults in no substantial prejudice, and affords a defendant his
constitutional rights, a combined proceeding is permissible.' 36 Since
punishment for violation of a protective order would vindicate the
authority of the court as well as benefit the complainant, a combined
proceeding could enforce Pennsylvania's Act.
Practically, however, a combined proceeding encourages com-
plication. Since a defendant still enjoys constitutional safeguards, in-
cluding an opportunity for pretrial release, no advantage over a
criminal proceeding is offered by a combined one. Moreover, confu-
sion in punishment could ensue from the meting out of distinct
sentences. Conceivably, two sentences could run concurrently, caus-
133. See Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 239-41 (1971).
134. 57 N.M. 627, 261 P.2d 655 (1953).
135. 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
136. Id at 298-01.
ing the coercive measure to lose all effectiveness. Once imprisoned
for a determinate term, a defendant would have no opportunity to
purge his civil sentence through compliance.
6. The Sounder Proceeding.-Consequently, neither a civil
proceeding nor a combined proceeding can effect enforcement of a
protective order through immediate and indeterminate incarceration
of a violator. Only a conditional sentence may be imposed. Addi-
tionally, a civil sanction lacks continued police enforcement, and a
combined sanction engenders procedural complications. In contrast,
criminal contempt sanctions benefit from swift police enforcement.
Thus, despite the inherent disadvantage in utilizing a criminal sanc-
tion, it appears the superior alternative and also the one capable of
amelioration.
B. Police Procedure
The police procedure provided to enforce the contempt provi-
sion reinforces the propriety of a criminal contempt sanction in
Pennsylvania. In accordance with the Act, a police officer may arrest
an apparent violator of a protective order on probable cause, regard-
less of whether the violation occurred in the officer's presence and, if
necessary, may verify the existence of the order by communicating
with the appropriate police department before making the warrant-
less arrest. 37 Thus, in contrast to the norm established by penal
codes, which generally proscribe warrantless arrests for misde-
meanor crimes unless committed in the officer's presence, 138 the Act
proffers an abused woman the immediate protection demanded by
the private nature of the domestic offense.
Although the amended contempt provision clearly defines and
expands the role of police enforcement, other sections of the Act lack
comparable procedural elaboration. In order to protect a plaintiff
adequately and to align with a recent trend in case law, 139 further
amendment of the Act, affirming the protective duties of the police,
is needed. For example, when an officer first responds to a distress
call he should have a statutory duty to both assist an abused person
in obtaining medical treatment and impartially inform him of rights
and available remedies,'4 including possible criminal and civil pro-
ceedings as well as shelter services.
137. Act of June 23, 1978, P.L. -, No. 81, § 10(c), amending PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35,
§§ 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977).
138. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
139. Sorichetti v. City of New York, 95 Misc. 2d 451, 408 N.Y.S.2d 219 (1978) (a peace
officer has an obligation as well as the authority to act when a violation of an order of protec-
tion is reported); Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rey'd, 64
App. Div. 2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978). See note 96 supra.
140. See note 80 supra.
C Appropriate Use of Bail Procedure
The major disadvantage of the contempt provision is the oppor-
tunity for pretrial release, which may subject the plaintiff to further
harm. Appropriate utilization of bail procedures currently available
under Pennsylvania Rules of Court, 4 ' however, would circumvent
possible allegations of invidious discrimination as well as protect a
victim from abuse.
Recently, the selection of bail procedure has invited equal pro-
tection analysis with examination focusing upon whether the setting
of bail unconstitutionally disadvantages the poor. Even though the
Supreme Court has only explicitly applied eighth amendment analy-
sis to bail procedure, requiring that bail not be excessive,' 42 the
Court has scrutinized related areas for fourteenth amendment infir-
mities. Specifically, in Williams v. Illinois'4 3 and Tate v. Short'44 the
Court extended equal protection analysis to criminal procedure, pro-
scribing the incarceration of indigents solely because of their inabil-
ity to pay criminal fines.
Subsequently, lower courts have applied similar equal protec-
tion analysis to pretrial release proceedings and have reached diverse
results. Under the minimal scrutiny rational relationship test bail
proceedings that discriminate against the poor survive, 45 but they
fail the stricter compelling state interest test. 146 Discriminatory pro-
cedure is legitimated under the former test as piecemeal legisla-
tion, 14' attempting to effect beneficial change in stages, but under the
latter test the procedure is declared invidious.
It would seem appropriate to grant either recognizance 48 or
nominal bail in order to avoid equal protection challenges and com-
141. PA. RULES OF CT. 4001-4018.
142. U.S. CONST. amend VIII. See, e.g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
143. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
144. 401 U.S. 395 (1971).
145. See, e.g., Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971), rehearing denied, 405 U.S. 948 (1972).
The rational relationship test invalidates a state-created classification that discriminates
against a given group only if the classification bears no rational relationship to a permissible
state objective. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533
(1973); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
146. The compelling state interest test examines strictly whether the state-created classifi-
cation is necessary for an important governmental interest. San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34 n.73 (1973). Whenever the classification includes a "suspect
class," the Court applies this strict scrutiny test. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
372 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
147. In Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), the court applied a
strict scrutiny test. Even though the court found a state need for assuring the presence of a
defendant at trial, it suggested that less drastic alternatives were available. Nevertheless, the
en banc majority refused to make state courts read in a presumption against money bail. See
generally 46 TENN. L. REv. 203 (1978).
148. PA. RULES OF CT. 4006.
ply with promulgated Pennsylvania Supreme Court rules that sug-
gest consideration of the defendant's financial status in setting
bail.'49 If a defendant to a contempt charge was released merely on
his affirmance to appear at a future hearing, however, a plaintiff
would have no assurance of safety during the interim. Currently,
when a defendant poses a threat of immediate physical harm to him-
self or to others, no absolute right to recognizance bail exists. 5 °
Thus, a permutation of recognizance bail is, required.
Conditioning recognizance bail on the continued good behavior
of a defendant would afford greater protection to a plaintiff as well
as accord with existing rules of court, which state that all forms of
bail may include conditions, 5' breach of which may result in forfei-
ture of the bond and arrest of the defendant. 52 Conditions enumer-
ated on the appearance bond could stipulate that the defendant (a)
refrain from further assaulting the plaintiff, (b) stay away from the
plaintiff and residence, and/or (c) receive counseling from social
service agencies. The knowledge that violation of any condition
would immediately revoke the right to mere recognizance bail
should sufficiently deter a defendant from further violation of the
protective order.
VI. Conclusion
Spouse abuse is a pervasive problem requiring an expeditious
solution. Because of the inherently complex and private nature of
familial violence, only a multifaceted solution will suffice. For an
abused woman desiring protection, several forms of relief, ranging
from a partial abrogation of the doctrine of interspousal immunity to
statutory provision for shelter services and judicial remedy, must be
available. First, since no sound policy reasons preclude suits be-
tween spouses for the commission of intentional torts, legal proceed-
ings should be permitted. Second, the state and federal governments
should establish and maintain refuges for battered women. Last, pe-
nal laws should be revised to proscribe spouse abuse specifically and
they must be enforced.
In addition to making spouse abuse a criminal offense, a civil
scheme similar to Pennsylvania's authorizing the issuance of protec-
tive orders, could prove beneficial. Swift and effective relief would
be available to a broad spectrum of potential victims. Through
proper enforcement of criminal contempt sanctions, conditioning
149. Id at 4004.
150. Id. at 4003.
151. Id at 4013.
152. Id at 4016.
bail, and requiring police to inform abused persons of their rights,
this statutory combination would provide a viable solution to the
problem.
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